Theory and practice of the confessional by Caspar Erich Schieler, Richard Frederick Clarke
The other opinion, that it is not allowed to reveal the accomplice, and in consequence that one is not bound to mention a mortal sin which cannot be confessed without revealing the accomplice, is taught, among others, by Canus, Petrus Soto, Ledesma, Navarrus, Valentia, Banez, etc. Busenbaum and Mazzotta deemed the opinion probable. These theologians urge that it is a violation of the natural law to injure the good name of another, and hence that the obligation of not inflicting such injury is potions juris than the duty of making a complete confession, since this is founded on a positive law.
It need not be imagined, however, that this opinion, is the benignior, because it releases from the duty of making a perfect confession; considered closely the case takes on quite another aspect, for:—
1. It requires the penitent to seek out another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown even when this involves great trouble to the penitent, for as all will concede, the integrity of the confession must be preserved so far as it is possible, and only the damage and hardship to the penitent which makes the confession morally impossible excuse from making a complete confession. Hence this incommodum must be grave and much greater than that which in the other view allows the defamation of the accomplice.
2. If, however, a man cannot confess to another confessor and is resolved to conceal the sin or its circumstances in order to save his neighbour's reputation, there arises a greater difficulty, the obligation of confessing the same sin again; for in order to save his neighbour's good name a man may only conceal that circumstance which affects the reputation of his neighbour, and this is the unanimous teaching of all theologians; for example, if a man has committed incest, and has no other means of confessing it, he must mention in his first confession that he has fallen into a sin of impurity, passing over in silence the circumstances which make it incest. He must, however, when opportunity is presented of going to another confessor, mention the circumstance of the incest, and this cannot be done without repeating his former accusation of having fallen into a sin against purity.
3. It is also to be observed that if defamation of one's neighbour excuses from a complete confession, and if in consequence a particular sin may not be revealed (for such is the foundation of this opinion), the confessor is not allowed to put questions which may cause an indirect revelation of the accomplice, especially to ill-instructed penitents who would have no idea of how to parry the questions. Now if these questions are to be avoided by the confessor, he may not inquire into the occasions of sin, or he must leave to the judgment and discretion of the penitent how far the latter is bound to answer the questions put to him. The consequences, as any one may see, implicate the direction of penitents in great difficulties, and on that account no one can admit either of these methods of action.
Now the confessor, in order to be faithful to his important duty of withdrawing his penitents from the occasions of sin, and in order not to be deceived by a penitent, who, left to his own judgment, will not realise the danger of the occasions, must question his penitent with perfect liberty and undeterred by the fear of obtaining any knowledge of the accomplice in sin, if it is probable though not certain that such defamation of the accomplice is not a reason dispensing from the integrity of the confession. This opinion is certainly probable.
